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Someone Old or Someone New?
The Effects of CEO Change on Corporate Entrepreneurship
J. L. Morrow, Jr.
Boards of directors often attempt to foster corporate
entrepreneurship by replacing a firm’s chief executive 
officer (CEO). Compelling theoretical arguments and
anecdotal evidence suggest that when firm performance
has suffered, a new CEO is best suited to lead the firm’s
creative endeavors. On the other hand, among firms that
retain their existing CEO after a decline in performance,
manipulating the CEO’s compensation package is a com-
mon governance practice used by boards to encourage
innovation. In these cases, some have argued that
increasing the CEO’s pay will encourage corporate entre-
preneurship, because the CEO has been compensated for
assuming additional risk. Counter to these propositions,
this study develops theoretical arguments that a firm’s
existing CEO is better equipped to foster corporate 
entrepreneurship and that this probability increases when
the CEO’s cash compensation is decreased. Results from
a sample of 100 single-product manufacturing firms 
suggest firms that retain their current CEO and decrease
the CEO’s cash compensation are most likely to engage in
corporate entrepreneurship. Implications that this research
has for corporate entrepreneurship, corporate gover-
nance, and firm performance are discussed.
T he CEOs of profit-seeking organizations arecharged with organizing the firm’s resources to create value. This has prompted some researchers
to theorize about the CEO’s role in corporate entrepre-
neurship (Brazeal and Herbert 1999; Floyd and
Wooldridge 1999; Greene, Brush, and Hart 1999; Stopford
and Baden-Fuller 1994). While no published research has
considered the impact of CEO succession on the process
of corporate entrepreneurship, a large body of research
has explored the relationship between CEO change and
subsequent organizational change (Miller 1993; Tushman
and Romanelli 1985; Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli
1992). Some of this research has focused on executive
succession following a decline in firm performance (Barker
and Duhaime 1997; Goodstein and Boeker 1991). The
prevailing wisdom seems to be that when firms experience
a period of declining performance, they should change
their CEOs as a first step in bringing about strategic orga-
nizational change. In support of this argument, an abun-
dance of literature suggests new CEOs are more likely to
undertake new strategic initiatives than old CEOs (Ford
and Baucus 1987; Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg 1978;
Tushman and Romanelli 1985). Many examples also exist
in the popular press of new CEOs who have successfully
brought about strategic organizational change (Iacocca
1984; Sager 1994). However, some research suggests
that existing CEOs may be best suited to lead the organi-
zation’s creative endeavors (Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett
1993; Sutton, Eisenhardt, and Jucker 1986; Virany et al.
1992). 
Consistent with research in organizational creativity
(Woodman, Sawyer, and Griffin 1993), corporate entrepre-
neurship is the outcome of a complex interaction among
individuals, groups, and the organization; and it seems
clear that corporate entrepreneurship is affected by a large
number of variables. However, it seems equally clear that
the knowledge base and level of expertise possessed by
individuals within the organization should also be a critical
component necessary for corporate entrepreneurship.
(Amabile 1979; Castanias and Helfat 1991; Greene et al.
1999; Penrose 1959). Indeed, Nonaka (1994: 21) argued
that the individual is the “prime mover in the process of
organizational knowledge creation” and that the quality of
tacit knowledge possessed by individuals is critical to the
creation of new strategies. Thus, firm-specific tacit knowl-
edge may be used to formulate valuable organizational
strategies, but such knowledge can only be developed by
repeated experiences with an organization’s routines
(Nelson and Winter 1982). 
The following quotation, attributed to Sir Joshua
Reynolds (1732–1792), illustrates the important role that
individuals play in the creation of value: “Invention is little
more than a new combination of those images which have
been previously gathered and deposited in the memory.
Nothing can be made of nothing. He who has laid up no
material can produce no combination” (quoted in Offner
1990). Reynolds was suggesting that the knowledge and
information possessed by individuals, which may be
viewed as the sum of one’s life experiences, is a crucial
element in creative behavior. However, the question
addressed in this study is whether individuals who current-
ly lead an organization, or individuals newly appointed to
lead an organization, are most likely to have the greatest
relevant stocks of knowledge and information that are use-
ful for corporate entrepreneurship. Also examined is the
question of what type of governance mechanism is most
likely to provide the CEO with the proper incentive to lead
and foster corporate entrepreneurship within the organiza-
tion. In other words, it is not sufficient that new CEOs just
bring about changes in the organization, but most impor-
tantly, these changes should create value that has the
potential to be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage.
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largely in the organizational theory literature, which sug-
gests that new CEOs are more likely than current CEOs to
bring about change in organizations for two reasons. First,
new CEOs bring to the firm “new causal knowledge” that
allows them to develop “new interpretations” of how the
firm should “interact with its environment” (Ford and
Baucus 1987; Starbuck et al. 1978). Second, the new CEO
is more likely to make changes in the organization
because he or she is unencumbered from prior emotional
involvement in the organization and is not tied to the orga-
nization’s “dominant logic” that may lead to such counter-
productive behavior as the escalation of commitment to a
failing course of action (Brockner 1992; Ford and Baucus,
1987; Prahalad and Bettis 1986; Staw 1981; Tushman and
Romanelli 1985). 
These arguments suggest that executive succession
changes the knowledge base and skill levels of the firm’s
CEO, which can lead to an improved ability to recognize
and respond to the firm’s changing environmental condi-
tions. While the old knowledge base may have been suit-
able for the old environment, the firm’s new environment
suggests the need for a new knowledge base. Thus, exec-
utive succession may be especially important for improv-
ing or sustaining firm performance following periods of
environmental turbulence (Virany et al. 1992). 
While this view is theoretically grounded and intuitively
appealing, the acquisition of a new knowledge base
through a new CEO is not without cost. Some have argued
that new managers incur “liabilities of newness” and need
time to understand the firm and its problems (Virany et al.
1992; Sutton et al. 1986). This may prove especially prob-
lematic if the new CEO is from a different industry and
unfamiliar with the types of resources used in his or her
new firm, and if the resources that give the firm its distinc-
tive competencies are difficult to understand or causally
ambiguous. Under these conditions, the new CEO will not
have the firm-specific skills or the tacit knowledge that the
current CEO had, which may be valuable to the process of
corporate entrepreneurship. Thus, while it may be obvious
“that prior competencies have been rendered obsolete, it
may not be clear what the new requisite competencies
might be” (Virany et al. 1992: 76).
Current CEOs Are Valuable
Some organization theorists have argued that executive
succession may actually have a negative impact on orga-
nizational outcomes. These researchers suggest that cur-
rent CEOs may be a key element in any attempt to suc-
cessfully change an organization (Amburgey et al 1993;
Sutton et al. 1986; Virany et al. 1992). For example,
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argued that a firm’s existing
CEO has greater knowledge of the productive potential of
the firm’s resources, and thus a superior basis on which to
make judgments about the potential valuable combina-
tions of the firm’s heterogeneous resources. Specifically,
they argued that “superior combinations of inputs can be
more economically identified and formed from resources
already used in the organization than by obtaining new
resources (and knowledge of them) from the outside”
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972: 793). It seems clear that
CEOs who have an understanding of the resources that a
firm controls and the environment in which it competes
should be more likely to pursue corporate entrepreneur-
ship by organizing and combining a firm’s resources in
valuable new ways than CEOs who do not have this
understanding. This suggests that CEOs may be valuable
because they have acquired firm-specific knowledge of the
firm’s resources and its competitive environment
(Castanias and Helfat 1991). 
Those who assert that new CEOs may be best suited to
lead a firm’s value creation efforts have failed to recognize
that there is a cost associated with replacing a CEO (or
else they implicitly assume that new CEOs are always able
to compensate for these costs). There are at least two
costs associated with replacing a CEO. First is the loss of
knowledge about the organization, its resources, and its
competition (Castanias and Helfat 1991). CEOs possess
three types of skills: generic, industry-related, and firm-
specific (Castanias and Helfat 1991). Generic skills are
those that can be easily transferred across firms. While
these skills may be used to create value, this value is not
likely to be long lasting because other firms can easily
acquire CEOs who also have these skills. Industry-related
skills are those that can be transferred among firms within
an industry. Industry-related skills may also be used to cre-
ate value but this value is also not likely to be long lasting
because other firms in the industry may also acquire CEOs
with these skills (although the pool of CEOs who possess
these skills will not be as large as the pool of CEOs with
generic managerial skills). Firm-specific CEO skills are
those that are specific to a particular firm and are therefore
only useful or potentially valuable within that firm. Thus,
firm-specific CEO skills are a potentially valuable resource
that may be useful in the process of corporate entrepre-
neurship. 
The second cost associated with CEO change is the
loss of valuable relationships or “social complexities” that
the current CEO may have developed (Barney 1986).
Besides individual differences among CEOs (e.g., stocks
of knowledge, life experiences), corporate entrepreneur-
ship is also influenced by complex social interactions
among individuals and groups within an organization
(Floyd and Wooldridge 1999). Group composition, leader-
ship, cohesiveness, communication, longevity, and group
structure have all been hypothesized to affect group 
creativity and innovation (King and Anderson 1990;
Nystrom 1979; Woodman et al., 1993). Some of the subtle
effects that groups may have on organizational creativity
are through social information in the workplace (Griffin
1983). Social information includes verbal and nonverbal
cues and signals that people in organizations provide each
other. This information is used to evaluate, prioritize, and
“make sense” of the various factors present in the 
workplace and how these factors may be organized and
used to solve problems. In sum, the creative capabilities of
groups is not equal to the aggregation of the creative
Firm Resources and Entrepreneurship
Schumpeter (1942) viewed entrepreneurship as the
process of carrying out new combinations (e.g., new prod-
ucts, product markets, processes, technologies) by relying
on the firm’s existing stock of resources. He also suggest-
ed that the purpose of the firm is to seize competitive
opportunities by creating or adopting innovations that
make competitors’ positions obsolete. Similarly, Penrose
(1959) argued that the growth of the firm is limited not by
the marketplace but instead by the creative capabilities of
the firm’s managers as they seek to take advantage of the
firm’s opportunities. Rumelt (1984) echoed the arguments
made by Schumpeter and Penrose by suggesting that
strategy should be viewed as entrepreneurship. If man-
agers can create certain processes that are ambiguous,
these processes have uncertain imitability and any bene-
fits that accrue to the firm from these processes may be
long lasting (Rumelt 1984). Schumpeter, Penrose, and
Rumelt each stressed that entrepreneurship is the source
of change and growth within a firm. Under this view, firms
that seek to change should use externally generated infor-
mation that is integrated with internal knowledge to devel-
op new ways of exploiting the firm’s existing resources. 
Sharma and Chrisman defined corporate entrepreneur-
ship as the “process whereby an individual or a group of
individuals, in association with an existing organization . .
. instigate renewal or innovation within that organization”
(1999: 18). Thus, corporate entrepreneurship is the
deployment of new resource combinations to renew an
organization (Guth and Ginsberg 1990). Corporate entre-
preneurship can occur internally, by exploiting the firm’s
existing stock of resources (Penrose 1959), or externally,
by the acquisition of new resources (Hitt et al. 1996).
However, because most attempts to create value in the
external environment through mergers and acquisitions fail
(Hoskisson and Hitt 1990), CEOs are increasingly looking
inside the firm for new sources of value. The emphasis on
creating value within the firm was noted by the CEO of one
Fortune 500 company who said, “I think innovation, most
of the time, is simply taking A, B, C, and D, which already
exist, and putting them together in a form called E”
(Marshall 1994: 270). This suggests that CEOs who
understand a firm’s existing set of resources may be in the
best position to reconfigure those resources in ways that
are newly valuable. Indeed, some have argued that man-
agerial expertise is a key firm resource that, when devel-
oped and exploited, has the potential to be a source of
sustained competitive advantage (Castanias and Helfat
1991). Castanias and Helfat (1991) used the phrase “man-
agerial rents” to refer to the increase in firm value attrib-
uted to superior managerial skills.
CEOs and Corporate Entrepreneurship
Human and social capital have been suggested as the
“fundamental building blocks” of corporate entrepreneur-
ship (Greene et al., 1999: 107). Much of the research
grounded in this view focuses on the role that individuals
within an organization play in corporate entrepreneurship.
These individuals are sometimes said to be corporate ven-
ture champions who are responsible for a particular entre-
preneurial process with an organization (Burgelman 1983;
Greene et al. 1999; Shane 1994; Venkataraman,
MacMillan, and McGrath 1992). For example, the champi-
on of ideas is an individual who seeks to convince organi-
zational stakeholders that an idea has merit, whereas the
resource champion presents the idea to those with the
power to allocate the resources needed to complete the
project (Venkataraman et al. 1992).
Clearly the CEO is intertwined among the firm’s human
and social capital that is crucial for fostering corporate
entrepreneurship (Greene et al. 1999). While the firm’s
CEO may not serve as the corporate venture champion
(although in some firms, particularly small firms [Miller
1983], the CEO may serve in this capacity), it seems rea-
sonable to argue that the CEO may be a “central actor” in
the eventual emergence of many entrepreneurial initiatives
(Stopford and Baden-Fuller 1994). Floyd and Wooldridge
(1999) defined central actors as key individuals in the
firm’s communication processes who are also likely to
have a direct impact on entrepreneurial initiatives. 
Brazeal and Herbert (1999) also suggested that top
management plays a key role in corporate entrepreneur-
ship. For example, the entrepreneurial process is enabled
by the allocation of resources and the articulation of a
strategic vision, roles that are traditionally reserved for top
management. In addition, an organization’s CEO may fos-
ter corporate entrepreneurship “through the building of an
entrepreneurial organizational environment and human
resource practices that actively promote entrepreneurial
activities and thinking” (Brazeal and Herbert 1999: 41). By
doing these things, the CEO enhances the firm’s ability to
produce innovative outcomes. In sum, the CEO may play
a key role in corporate entrepreneurship in part, because
of his or her knowledge of the firm’s resources and his or
her abilities to influence the social dynamics within the firm
(Floyd and Wooldridge 1999). 
CEO Change and Corporate
Entrepreneurship
Research has found that firms often replace their CEOs
and undertake new strategic initiatives following a decline
in performance, although this research has largely ignored
the question of whether these changes are valuable
(Wiersema and Bantel 1993). The popular press also
offers anecdotal evidence that organizations may hire new
CEOs to foster corporate entrepreneurship (Iacocca 1984;
Sager 1994). However, both empirical and theoretical
research offer differing views on the effect that CEO
change may have on corporate entrepreneurship. 
New CEOs Are Needed
Theoretical arguments that support a change in CEOs as
a prelude to corporate entrepreneurship are grounded
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Gomez-Mejia 1998: 140). Thus, threats to the cash com-
ponent of a CEO’s pay would seem to be of greater 
concern to the CEO than threats to his or her deferred
compensation (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 1998). 
Decreasing the CEO’s cash compensation may moti-
vate the CEO to pursue corporate entrepreneurship
because it signals that the board of directors recognizes
the firm’s decline in performance, holds the CEO respon-
sible, and suggests that continued declines in firm per-
formance will not be tolerated.1 Unlike a change in
deferred compensation, a reduction in cash compensation
is immediate and real. It hits the CEO hard in his or her
paycheck. A reduction in cash compensation following a
period of declining performance also implies that an
increase in cash compensation will follow a period of
improved performance. This suggests that the CEO will
realize personal benefits from the pursuit of corporate
entrepreneurship immediately, rather than having to wait
and receive a reward through deferred compensation. 
The notion of reducing the CEO’s cash compensation
following a period of performance decline in an effort to
induce desired managerial actions is also consistent with
the long-held tenants of operant conditioning theory
(Skinner 1969). Skinner argued that people will seek to
perform tasks that lead to desired outcomes while avoid-
ing behaviors that lead to undesired outcomes. By “linking
the performance of specific behaviors to the attainment of
specific outcomes,” organizational members can be moti-
vated to achieve desired organizational goals (Jones,
George, and Hill 2000: 442, emphasis in the original).
Negative reinforcement, which is the removal of an unde-
sired outcome (the decrease in cash compensation) upon
the performance of a specific behavior, may be useful in
achieving desired organizational outcomes (e.g., corpo-
rate entrepreneurship). The use of financial reinforcers
(money) as an outcome of desired behaviors has been
found to be particularly effective because employees can
exchange money for other desired outcomes (e.g., goods
and services) (Komaki, Coombs, and Schepman 1996). In
sum, a reduction in the CEO’s cash compensation follow-
ing a period of poor firm performance should provide the
CEO with an incentive to improve the firm’s performance
(through corporate entrepreneurship) while an increase in
cash compensation following a period of poor performance
provides a disincentive for corporate entrepreneurship. 
Hypothesis 2: Changes in the CEO’s cash
compensation will be inversely related to 
corporate entrepreneurship.
Methods
This section examines the outcomes from a sample of 100
single-product manufacturing firms. The results suggest
that firms that retain their current CEO and decrease the
CEO’s cash compensation are most likely to engage in
corporate entrepreneurship.
Sample
The population for this study included all single-product
manufacturing companies from 1982 to 1994 identified in
the COMPUSTAT database. A company was considered a
single-product company if at least 95 percent of its sales
came from one segment (Rumelt 1974). A total of 980
firms was identified that met this criterion. The focus of this
study was on internal corporate entrepreneurship. Thus,
single-product firms were chosen because diversified firms
are likely to innovate by engaging in external innovation by
changing the mix of businesses within their portfolio (Hitt
et al. 1996). Using only single-product manufacturing firms
also increased the homogeneity of the population and sim-
plified some of the measurement issues.
Brazeal and Herbert (1999) argued that a change in
environmental conditions, such as a decline in firm per-
formance, can foster corporate entrepreneurship by creat-
ing an opportunity for innovation to occur. Thus, firms were
identified that had suffered a decline in performance on the
belief that these firms would be likely to engage in corpo-
rate entrepreneurship. Jensen’s alpha (Jensen 1968,
1969) is a commonly used measure to assess a firm’s per-
formance relative to other firms in the stock market
(Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel 1994). Specifically, it
represents the average return for a particular firm’s stock
over (or under) that predicted by the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM), given the firm’s beta and the average mar-
ket return. Thus, it indicates the extent to which a firm has
met, failed to meet, or exceeded investors’ expectations
during the year, compared to a portfolio of firms having a
similar risk profile (Lubatkin and Rogers 1989). To be
selected for the sample, a firm needed at least two years
of successful performance (exceeding or meeting
investors’ expectations) followed by a year of decline (fail-
ing to meet expectations). The year of decline was identi-
fied as time (t). Using these criteria, a sample of 200 firms
was identified and no firm appeared in the sample more
than once.2
Measures 
No empirical studies were found that addressed the time
period between the occurrence of lower than expected firm
performance and action by management aimed at improv-
ing firm performance. However, some have suggested that
this time period is relatively short (less than one year)
(Hoskisson et al. 1994). Thus, for purposes of this study,
the year following a decline in performance (t+1) was con-
sidered the time period during which firms would be most
likely pursue corporate entrepreneurship as a means of
improving firm performance.
Corporate Entrepreneurship. The Wall Street Journal
index and the Lexis/Nexis database were used to identify
announcements by firms of changes that they intended to
make during the year (t+1). To be considered corporate
entrepreneurship, the announcement had to involve
changes to the firm’s products, product markets, 
processes, or technologies. This is consistent with Brazeal
and Herbert’s definition of innovation as involving the
capabilities of individual group members; instead there is
a reciprocal relationship. Individual creative capabilities
both effect, and are effected by, the creative capabilities
within groups (Woodman et al. 1993).
At the individual level, CEOs may be valuable because
of the unique stocks of knowledge and information that
they possess. However, at the group level, CEOs may also
be valuable for reasons that are socially complex (Barney
1986; Castanias and Helfat 1991; Wernerfelt 1989). For
example, CEOs may be valuable because of their skills at
leading, motivating, and inspiring others within the organi-
zation. This assumes that these “others” are then able to
create value that would not have been created without the
leadership, motivation, and/or inspiration provided by the
CEO. CEOs may also be valuable because of relation-
ships that have been developed with others in the organi-
zation. These socially complex relationships may involve
such things as friendship, teamwork, and the ability to
communicate (Wernerfelt 1989). Another possible benefit
of this social capital is the development of trust, which can
be used to foster creativity and the exchange of resources
within the firm (Fukuyama 1996; Woodman et al.  1993).
Others have noted that corporate entrepreneurship is
dependent on the attitude of individuals within the firm
(Stevenson and Jarillo 1990), determined in part of the atti-
tude of the CEO. Finally, CEOs may be an integral part of
the organization’s culture, and this culture may also be a
valuable organizational resource (Barney 1986). 
Of course, boards of directors may decide to replace
CEOs precisely because they do not have many of these
valuable characteristics. Arguably, many CEOs are
replaced in anticipation that the new CEO will be better
suited to fostering corporate entrepreneurship because of
his or her contributions to socially complex relationships
within the firm. However, CEOs who are valuable for
socially complex reasons are in a unique position (they
have valuable firm-specific skills), and new CEOs are like-
ly to need more time to have equal or similar effects with-
in the organization. 
Hypothesis 1: CEO change will have a negative effect on
corporate entrepreneurship.
Corporate Governance and Corporate
Entrepreneurship
Clearly there are contextual factors within an organization
that may act to enhance or constrain corporate entrepre-
neurship and firms may need to alter these contextual fac-
tors to encourage innovation. The organization’s reward
system is one contextual factor that may influence the cre-
ative behavior of individuals and groups (Woodman et al.
1993). Changing the reward system to encourage corpo-
rate entrepreneurship is consistent with much of the strat-
egy implementation literature that stresses the importance
of managerial incentives as a means of controlling CEO
actions (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Goodstein and
Boeker 1991; Hoskisson, Hitt, Turk, and Tyler 1989). This
literature is grounded in agency theory, which suggests
that the interests of the parties in an agency relationship
may diverge over time and governance mechanisms (e.g.,
rewards) are needed to realign these interests (Fama and
Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Even if CEOs
are capable of fostering corporate entrepreneurship, they
may need incentives in the form of executive compensa-
tion to actually do so. 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) noted that while
researchers have a long history of seeking to identify a
relationship between executive pay and firm performance,
there is very little empirical evidence that this relationship
actually exists (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Garen 1994).
Henderson and Fredrickson (1996) also noted the nonex-
istent (or weak) relationship between CEO pay and firm
performance and called for research that focuses on the
relationship between the substantive nature of the CEO’s
job and his or her compensation. Carpenter (2000) argued
that CEO pay may be a critical determinant of why some
firms engage in strategic change and others do not. He
argued that a modification of the CEO’s pay is needed to
encourage a CEO to pursue strategic change. Others
have suggested that strategic change is risky from the
CEO’s perspective and that CEOs should be compensat-
ed for assuming this additional risk, along with the addi-
tional complexity that managing this change will bring
(Henderson and Fredrickson 1996; Sanders and
Carpenter 1998). 
This study also placed the issue of CEO compensation
in an action-based framework by focusing on the desired
behavior of the CEO, specifically the quality of the actions
taken by the firm. This is consistent with the view that one
role of executive compensation is to encourage departures
from the status quo (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997)
and implies that changes in CEO compensation are
reflected in some action taken in an effort to improve firm
performance (in this case, corporate entrepreneurship).
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) suggested
researchers should examine individual elements of the
CEO’s compensation package, rather than focusing on
total compensation. However, which elements of the
CEO’s total compensation are most like to encourage cor-
porate entrepreneurship? Top managers receive compen-
sation in one or more of the following forms (Castanias and
Helfat 1991): salary, bonuses, deferred compensation
(e.g., stock options), and perquisites. Wiseman and
Gomez-Mejia (1998) argued that managers distinguish
between the cash component (salary plus bonuses) of
their total compensation and the deferred compensation
component. 
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) contend that
because deferred compensation is an unreliable source of
income, executives generally consider only their base pay
when calculating their perceived wealth. This seems rea-
sonable when one considers that executives make major
purchase decisions (e.g., homes) “on the premise, by both
the buyer and lender, that the buyer’s current base pay will
continue indefinitely into the future” (Wiseman and
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larger sample in terms of firm size or slack. The following




Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and cor-
relations of the variables used in this study. The results of
the logistic regression model used to test the hypotheses
are presented in Table 2. The overall model had a chi-
square statistic of 13.882 which was statistically significant
(p<.05). CEO change (p<.01) and change in the CEO’s
cash compensation (p<.05) were statistically significant
and both had negative signs. Among the control variables,
CEO power (p<.10) was statistically significant and had a
negative sign. Firm size and slack were not statistically
significant. 
These results support hypothesis 1, which stated that
CEO change would have a negative effect on corporate
entrepreneurship. The percentage change in the CEO’s
cash compensation also had an inverse relationship to
corporate entrepreneurship, which supports hypothesis 2.
Powerful CEOs have a negative effect on corporate entre-
preneurship while entrepreneurship does not appear to be
influenced by organizational size and slack.
Innovation is a rare event (Simon 1993). Thus, it seems
reasonable to argue that corporate entrepreneurship
among poorly performing firms would be a relatively rare
occurrence. Only 17 percent of the firms in this sample
exhibited corporate entrepreneurship, which is consistent
with expectations and offers face validity for the measure
that was used. A post-hoc analysis was also conducted to
further test the validity of the coding methodology used to
operationalize corporate entrepreneurship. If these
announcements are truly indicative of corporate entrepre-
neurship, then they would be expected to have a positive
effect on firm performance. Ordinary least squares regres-
sion was used to estimate a model to test the influence of
these announcements on firm performance (operational-
ized as the firm’s return on investment [ROI] in time t+1).
ROI has been suggested as an appropriate performance
measure to assess the success of corporate ventures
(Elder and Shimanski 1987). After controlling for ROI in
“refinement or modification of existing policies, proce-
dures, product lines, and services” (1999: 36).
Operationalizing corporate entrepreneurship in this man-
ner is also consistent with Venkataraman and his col-
leagues who viewed corporate entrepreneurship as a
process “by which members of an existing firm bring into
existence products and markets which do not currently
exist within the repertoire of the firm” (1992: 488).
Of the 200 firms in the initial sample that had experi-
enced a decline in performance, only 103 firms made
some type of announcement regarding new products,
product markets, processes, or technologies during the
year that followed their year of decline. A summary of
these announcements, along with a brief description of the
firm and its competitive environment, were provided to an
expert panel for coding. The use of a panel to subjectively
rate the quality of managerial behaviors (e.g., corporate
entrepreneurship) seems an appropriate methodology
because “behavior criteria normally involve subjective
assessments about executive behaviors” (Gomez-Mejia
and Wiseman 1997: 321). The panel was instructed not to
consult with each other or with outside sources when cod-
ing the announcements and to use only their professional
judgment, education, and experiences (along with the
information provided) in coding the announcements. 
The panel consisted of four doctoral students, majoring
in strategic management, who were at the dissertation
stage. Each of the students held a master of business
administration (MBA) degree before beginning their doc-
toral program and had an average of 6.5 years of industry
work experience. Three of the four panelists worked in the
area of asset valuations with Fortune 500 companies. The
topics of the students’ dissertation research closely paral-
leled the topics of the announcements they were asked to
code (e.g., strategic management of innovations, interna-
tional strategies, strategic alliances). 
The panel was asked to identify those announcements
most likely to be perceived by the firm’s investors 
(or potential investors) as valuable new products, product
markets, processes, or technologies. They were also
asked to consider whether this value would be difficult for
competing firms to imitate within one year. The dependent
variable, corporate entrepreneurship (CE), was dummy
coded (1,0) for the presence or absence of a valuable
announcement regarding new products, product markets,
processes, or technologies that should be difficult to 
imitate within one year. Cronbach’s alpha was used to test
for interrater reliability and it exceeded .70 in all cases. 
Change in CEO. CEO change was operationalized as
a change in the firm’s chief executive officer (NEWCEO).
This variable was dummy coded (1=change in CEO, 0=no
change) during the year of decline (t) as disclosed in the
company’s 10-K report.
Change in CEO Cash Compensation. The percent-
age change in the CEO’s cash compensation (salary plus
bonuses) following the year of declining performance was
used to operationalize this variable (cash compensation in
t+1 minus cash compensation in t divided by cash com-
pensation in t). These data (CASHCOMP) were obtained
from each firm’s 10-K report.
Control Variables
Slack. Both too much and too little slack have been
found to be detrimental to innovation (Nohria and Gulati
1996). Because it is difficult to predict the effect that slack
may have on corporate entrepreneurship, slack was used
as a control variable. Slack was operationalized as work-
ing capital adjusted for size (current assets minus current
liabilities divided by total assets) in the year of decline (t).
This operationalization captures a firm’s ability to meet its
immediate resource needs and is a measure of immediate
slack. The source for these data was COMPUSTAT.
Firm Size. The natural log of a firm’s total assets during
the year of decline (t) was used to control for firm size
because firm size has been argued to affect the ability of a
firm to change (Thompson 1967). The source for these
data was COMPUSTAT. 
CEO Power. Power is the ability to get others to do
what you would want them to do. If a single individual is
powerful and creative, then CEO power should have a
positive effect on corporate entrepreneurship (Mone,
McKinley, and Barker 1998). However, if corporate entre-
preneurship is viewed as the outcome of social interaction
that occurs within groups, then a powerful CEO may actu-
ally stifle corporate entrepreneurship. Because it is easy to
believe that CEO power could have an effect on corporate
entrepreneurship, but difficult to predict the direction of
that effect, CEO power is treated as a control variable
(Gray and Ariss 1985). 
Finkelstein (1992) defined structural power as power
that arises from “the distribution of formal positions within
an organization. The greater managers’ structural power,
the less their dependence on other members of the domi-
nant coalition” (1992: 512). To operationalize structural
power, Finkelstein (1992) created a structural power scale
that included “cash compensation of an executive divided
by the compensation of the highest paid manager in the
same firm” and noted that “compensation can be consid-
ered an important indicator of formal power” (1992: 512).
Others have found that powerful CEOs may use their
power to “help them obtain higher levels of compensation”
(David, Kochhar, and Levitas 1998: 204). In the research
reported here, power was operationalized as the propor-
tion of the CEO’s salary relative to other members of the
firm’s top management team (vice president level and
above) was operationalized. These data were obtained
from each firm’s proxy statement during the year t+1.
Statistical Analyses
Missing data reduced the sample size from 103 firms to
100 firms. While the reduction in sample size was very
small, it was tested for differences between these two
samples. There were not statistically significant differ-
ences (using t tests) between the reduced sample and the
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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Variable N Means s.d 1 2 3 4 5
1. Corporate entrepreneurship 100 0.17 0.377
2. CEO change 100 0.110 0.314 .266c
3. Cash compensation 100 0.114 0.358 .185a -.085
4. Power 100 0.393 0.129 .042 -.220b -.199b
5. Size 100 3.221 1.572 .079 .043 .398d -.049
6. Slack 100 0.405 0.269 .040 -.117 .179a .171a .092
a. p < .10
b. p < .05
c. p < .01
d. p < .001
Table 2
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis







CEO change -2.384 8.874c




a. p < .10
b. p < .05
c. p < .01
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time t, the announcements that were coded by the panel
had a positive effect on ROI in time t+1 (p<.05), which sug-
gests the announcements that were coded by the panel as
entrepreneurial events had a positive effect on ROI. The
finding from this post-hoc analysis provides additional evi-
dence of construct validity for the coding methodology
used in this study.
Finally, logistic regression allows the computation of
probabilities for the presence of corporate entrepreneur-
ship (CE=1). The coefficients are interpreted the same as
in ordinary least squares regression except that they refer
to the probability of the dependent variable being present,
rather than to the level of the dependent variable (Aldrich
and Nelson 1984). Using equation 2, values for the vari-
ables can be substituted and then multiplied by the coeffi-
cients from Table 2 to arrive at the probability of corporate
entrepreneurship under various conditions (Mendenhall
and Sincich 1989). This analysis provides a clearer picture
of the effects of changes in the independent variables on
the probability of CE=1.
Probability CE=1 = 
b0+b1(CASHCOMP)+b2(NEWCEO1)   (equation 2)1+b0+b1(CASHCOMP)+b2(NEWCEO1)
The mean change in cash compensation for CEOs in
the sample was an increase of 11 percent with a standard
deviation of 36. Table 3 presents the probabilities of corpo-
rate entrepreneurship under the conditions of CEO change
and no CEO change, when the percentage change in cash
compensation is zero, is decreased by one standard devi-
ation from the mean (–25%), is at the mean (11%) and is
increased by one standard deviation above the mean
(+47%). With no CEO change, the probability of corporate
entrepreneurship increases as cash compensation is
decreased. This analysis provides additional support for
hypothesis 2, which predicted that changes in a CEO’s
cash compensation will have an inverse relationship with
corporate entrepreneurship. Also note from Table 3 that
the probability of corporate entrepreneurship when there is
no change in the CEO’s cash compensation is 78 percent
when the current CEO is left in place but only 53 percent if
the firm hires a new CEO. This analysis provides addition-
al support for hypothesis 1, which predicts that CEO
change will have a negative effect on corporate entrepre-
neurship. Consistent with the theoretical arguments, the
probability of corporate entrepreneurship following a
decline in firm performance is maximized by retaining the
current CEO and decreasing his or her cash compensa-
tion, while the probability of corporate entrepreneurship is
minimized by hiring a new CEO. 
Discussion
Most studies of CEO change have focused on the effect of
executive change on subsequent firm performance
(Kesner and Sebora 1994). However, these new CEOs
must first “do something” before firm performance can be
affected and relatively few studies have focused on the
effect that CEO change has on these other “intermediate”
organizational outcomes (Friedman and Saul 1991;
Greiner and Bhambri 1989; Miller 1993; Welsh and
Dechler 1988). If corporate entrepreneurship, such as
innovation and creativity, is the basis for competition
among organizations (Penrose 1959; Rumelt 1984;
Schumpeter 1942), and if organizations often experience
CEO change, then understanding the effect that CEO
change has on corporate entrepreneurship has important
implications for both research and practice. 
The theoretical arguments offered in this article for the
important role that existing CEOs play in corporate entre-
preneurship are grounded in the belief that corporate
entrepreneurship is the result of people working together
in a social context and that disruptions to this social 
context (e.g., CEO change) will serve to constrain rather
than foster corporate entrepreneurship. This view, and the
supporting empirical results, are consistent with a narrow
stream of research that has argued for the recognition that
“old” CEOs may represent a potentially valuable organiza-
tional resource (Sutton et al. 1986; Virany et al. 1992;
Castanias and Helfat 1991). New CEOs are less likely to
be valuable because they incur liabilities of newness
(Amburgey et al. 1993) and need time to understand the
firm’s resources, routines, and social relationships that are
necessary for corporate entrepreneurship. 
Firms that change CEOs might reduce their liabilities of
newness by selecting an insider to succeed the current
CEO. Insiders would possess firm-specific skills that could
be useful in corporate entrepreneurship. However, even
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though an “insider CEO” would have presumably been a
member of the old top management team, the social com-
plexities developed by the old CEO are disrupted or
destroyed. Selecting an insider to lead the firm does little
to attenuate the loss of social complexities within the firm,
particularly since many old members of the top manage-
ment team may feel compelled to leave the firm to make
way for a new team (Keck and Tushman 1993). CEO suc-
cession, even by insiders, is likely to disrupt organization-
al momentum and alter the context and conditions under
which the top management team operates (Keck and
Tushman 1993; Miller 1993). The data in this study also
seem to support these arguments. 
Among the 100 firms in the sample, 17 exhibited corpo-
rate entrepreneurship and only 5 of these changed CEOs.
Of these 5 new CEOs, 4 where insiders and 1 was a relat-
ed outsider. In all, 11 firms in the sample hired new CEOs
and 5 of these demonstrated corporate entrepreneurship.
Of the 6 firms with new CEOs that failed to demonstrate
corporate entrepreneurship, 4 were insiders and 2 were
related outsiders. Thus, even though almost all of the new
CEOs possessed firm-specific knowledge, only about half
of those new CEOs were able to use that knowledge to
pursue corporate entrepreneurship. This seems to indicate
that social complexities within the organization play an
important role in corporate entrepreneurship (Floyd and
Wooldridge 1999; Greene et al. 1999), perhaps a more
important role than specific knowledge of the firm’s
resource base.
At least one qualification seems in order to the finding
that CEO change has a negative effect on corporate entre-
preneurship. The announcements were collected in the
year following a decline in firm performance (t+1) and CEO
turnover was measured at the end of the year of decline
(t). It is possible that organizations that changed CEOs
eventually exhibited corporate entrepreneurship and that
CEO change delayed, rather than stifled, the creativity of
those within the organization. Thus, to be more precise,
changing CEOs had a negative effect on corporate entre-
preneurship immediately following the year of succession
(t+1). Whether this effect holds in subsequent years is an
interesting question for future research. 
The results of this study also support the arguments
made by Woodman and his colleagues (1993) that contex-
tual factors, such as the organization’s reward system,
may be used to foster, or inhibit, creativity by individuals
working together in a complex social system. This argu-
ment, grounded in agency theory, suggests that an organi-
zation’s incentive system may be used to align the actions
of managers with the goals of the shareholders, and has
received widespread support in other research studies
(Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Goodstein and Boeker
1991; Hoskisson et al. 1989). The results presented in this
study, point to the fact that cash compensation plays an
important role in encouraging CEOs to pursue corporate
entrepreneurship. Specifically, reducing a CEO’s cash
compensation following a period of performance decline
appears to encourage corporate entrepreneurship. This
argument is also supported by Carpenter (2000), who
found a negative relationship between changes in the cash
component of the CEO’s salary package and subsequent
strategic change (measured by deviation from industry
strategy norms).
Interestingly, while all of the firms in the sample experi-
enced a decline in firm performance, the average change
in the CEO’s cash compensation following this year of
decline was an increase of 11 percent. At least two infer-
ences can be drawn from this observation. First, much
work remains to be accomplished by boards of directors in
the areas of corporate governance in general, and CEO
compensation incentives in particular. Second, it should
not be surprising that only 17 percent of the firms in the
sample exhibited corporate entrepreneurship following the
year of decline if the average CEO enjoys cash compen-
sation increases of 11 percent during this period regard-
less of any firm innovations. This also appears consistent
with a proposition by Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997:
359) that executive compensation designs similar to those
of competitors (e.g., those that increase CEO pay despite
a decline in performance) will serve to foster strategic con-
formity rather than strategic change.
Conclusions
This research has explored the effect of CEO change on
corporate entrepreneurship following a year of poor firm
performance. Given the frequency of CEO change within
organizations and the role of corporate entrepreneurship
in gaining and sustaining a competitive advantage, the
findings from this study have interesting implications for
both academic researchers and management practition-
ers. Conventional wisdom suggests that when firm per-
formance suffers, firms often need new CEOs. However,
this research found that CEO succession has a negative
effect on corporate entrepreneurship, perhaps because of
the loss of firm-specific skills and the disruption of social
complexities within the firm. Clearly there are cases when
new CEOs are needed to lead an organization. However,
replacing a CEO simply because a firm has experienced a
decline in performance may be analogous to replacing a
bus driver just because he or she made once a wrong turn
and became lost. By changing CEOs, firms may be elimi-
nating the one person who not only may know where the
firm took a wrong turn, but may also know how to lead the
organization back on the road to recovery. 
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